Does More Crime Mean More Prisoners? An Instrumental Variables Approach by Listokin, Yair





This paper studies the mechanical theory of crime and incarceration-the notion
that changes in imprisonment are partially determined by changes in crime rates.
Previous studies found scant evidence supporting the mechanical theory. These stud-
ies, however, failed to properly control for simultaneity between incarceration rates
and crime rates. While more crime may lead to larger prison populations, rising
incarceration rates may deter crime. To address this bias, abortion rates in the 1970s
are used as an instrument for crime in later decades. Abortion rates in the 1970s are
correlated with crime in the 1990s but are unlikely to be otherwise related to incar-
ceration or prison admissions rates in the 1990s. The instrumental variables approach
finds that the estimated elasticity of prison admissions with respect to crime is ap-
proximately 1, in accord with the mechanical theory. This finding has important
implications for understanding trends in the U.S. prison population.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE effect of crime rates on the prison population should be a mechanical
one. As two criminologists note, "Imprisonment is a criminal sanction: its
use will therefore fluctuate in direct proportion to changes in the level of the
behavior to which it is designed to respond."' While this theory could hardly
be more straightforward, its empirical relevance is a matter of some contro-
versy. Numerous empirical studies of the relationship between crime rates
and the scale of imprisonment have found almost no evidence supporting
* I would like to thank Debopam Bhattacharya, Gad Levanon, Stephanie Listokin, Aprajit
Mahajan, Christina Paxson, Alessandro Tarozzi, Jim Vere, an anonymous referee, and the
participants in Princeton University's Development Lunch Seminar for their helpful comments
and suggestions; and John Donohue and Steven Levitt for graciously sharing their data. I am
especially grateful to Anne Case and Jeffrey Kling for their invaluable help and guidance. All
errors are my own.
'Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon J. Hawkins, The Scale of Imprisonment 121 (1991).
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the hypothesis that more crime leads to higher incarceration rates.2 This stark
dissonance between theory and empirics has been called the "paradox in
crime and incarceration." 3
The debate over the impact of crime rates on incarceration rates is part of
a broader debate regarding rising incarceration rates in the United States.4
The prison population of the United States has burgeoned over the last 30
years, increasing almost fivefold between 1970 and 2000 and more than
doubling between 1985 and 1997 (see Figure 1). Some criminologists at-
tribute some (but certainly not all) of this massive increase in imprisonment
(particularly in the 1980s) to an increase in the propensity to commit crime.'
Many others, however, dismiss this claim, citing the many studies that find
no relationship between changes in crime rates and changes in incarceration.6
This debate has important policy ramifications; some commentators have
pointed to the seemingly irrational relationship between imprisonment and
crime as evidence of the generally perverse behavior of the prison system
and have used this evidence to bolster their calls for an overhaul of the penal
incarceration system in the United States.7 Thus, determining the validity of
"mechanical theories" of imprisonment rates, such as the impact of crime
rates on imprisonment rates, is a critical policy task.
There are several reasons why the effect of crime on imprisonment rates
may be hard to identify, even if there is a link between the amount of crime
and the number of prisoners. Most important, endogeneity bias confounds
2Id. at 121-25; Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High? 45 Crime &
Delinq. 421-22 (1999); Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Prison Population Growth
and Crime Reduction, 10 J. Quantitative Criminology 109 (1994); Lee H. Bowker, Crime and
the Use of Prisons in the United States: A Time-Series Analysis, 27 Crime & Delinq. 206
(1981); and William G. Nagel, On Behalf of a Moratorium on Prison Construction, 23 Crime
& Delinq. 154, 160, 172-74 (1977), for examples of studies that find no effect of crime on
imprisonment. Studies such as David Biles, Crime and the Use of Prisons, 43 Fed. Probation
39 (1979); Gary Sykes, Gennaro E. Vito, & Karen McElrath, Jail Populations and Crime Rates:
An Exploratory Analysis, 15 J. Police Sci. & Admin. 72 (1987); Patrick A. Langan, America's
Soaring Prison Population, 251 Science 1568 (1991); and Marc Ouimet & Pierre Tremblay,
A Normative Theory of the Relationship between Crime Rates and Imprisonment Rates: An
Analysis of the Penal Behavior of U.S. States from 1972 to 1992, 33 J. Res. Crime & Delinq.
109, 114-24 (1996), find some (very weak) impact of crime on imprisonment. See also the
literature review in a survey article by the Florida Corrections Commission, which concludes
that "most studies found no relationship between the two rates [crime and imprisonment];
when a relationship is found, the results are mixed and weak." Florida Corrections Commission,
The Relationship between Crime Rates and Incarceration Rates (December 1994) (http://
www.fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/rates/rateind.html).
' National Center for Policy Analysis, Paradox in Crime and Incarceration (1998) (http://
www.ncpa.org/pi/crime/an98e.html).
' See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 117-20; and Tonry, supra note 2, at 419-34,
for overviews of this debate.
' Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from
Prison Overcrowding Litigation, I ll Q. J. Econ. 319 (1996).
6 See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note I, chap. 5, and the sources cited there.
See Nagel, supra note 2, at 174; and Zimring & Hawkins, supra note I, chap. 5.
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FIGURE 1.-Incarceration rates and crime rates
attempts to estimate the response of incarceration rates to crime rates. Since
the number of prisoners affects the amount of crime, treating crime as an
exogenous variable in a regression of imprisonment rates on crime rates is
an inappropriate assumption. In addition, the relationship between the number
of prisoners (or even the change in the number of prisoners) and the amount
of crime is complex and dynamic.8 Since convicted criminals often spend
more than 1 year in prison, the number of individuals in prison in any given
year depends not only on the crime rate for that year but also on many lags
of the crime rate.
This paper employs two strategies to confront the empirical complications
that plague previous studies of the impact of crime on incarceration. The
endogeneity biases are addressed using an instrumental variables approach.
This paper uses abortion rates in the 1970s as an instrument for crime rates.
John Donohue and Steven Levitt's seminal paper on abortion and crime
demonstrated that abortion rates in the 1970s (which varied widely across
states) are systematically related to changes in crime rates in the 1990s.9
Moreover, it seems quite plausible that, after controlling for state fixed effects,
' See Bowker, supra note 2; and Marvell & Moody supra note 2, for time-series treatments
of crime and imprisonment.
'John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116
Q. J. Econ. 379 (2001).
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abortion rates in the 1970s will be unrelated to incarceration rates in the
1990s (except through abortion's impact on crime).
To mitigate the difficulties associated with estimating the dynamic rela-
tionship between crime and incarceration, this paper focuses on admissions
to prison rather than on the aggregate prison population. Unlike the total
prison population, admissions to prison should depend primarily on crime
rates in the present or recent past, thus moderating the need to examine the
impacts of lagged values of crime on incarceration.' While admissions to
prison are clearly an incomplete element of the response of imprisonment to
crime rates, they do constitute at least a partial test of a mechanical rela-
tionship between crime and imprisonment. Indeed, Patrick Langan notes that
"prison population growth since 1973 has been driven by increases in prison
admissions."''
Using prison admissions data (but not instrumenting) rather than total
imprisonment rates, this paper finds a significant relationship between crime
rates and entrances to prison. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of this
relationship find an elasticity of about .5, which suggests that a 1 percent
increase in crime is associated with a .5 percent increase in the number of
prison admissions. While significant, this elasticity falls far short of the
elasticity of I that is implied by a strictly mechanical relationship between
crime and imprisonment.
The results obtained after instrumenting to control for endogeneity
strengthen the hypothesis that crime rates mechanically influence incarcer-
ation rates. The instrumental variables estimates (which have high standard
errors, particularly after adjustments to correct for serial correlation) find an
elasticity of prison admissions with respect to crime of approximately 1; a
1 percent change in crime leads to a corresponding 1 percent change in
admissions to prison. These results suggest that endogeneity bias is an im-
portant obstacle that plagued previous studies of this issue.
Intriguingly, an elasticity of I is implied by the simplest version of the
mechanical hypothesis. If arrest rates and the probability of incarceration per
arrest are insensitive to changes in the crime rate, then incarceration rates
should move in direct proportion to crime rates, a prediction corroborated
by the IV results found here.
These findings imply that the mechanical theory of imprisonment, so al-
luringly intuitive, has some empirical validity, contrary to the claims of some
observers.' 2 It is not quite a "theory in search of facts."' 3 Ceteris paribus, an
"The advantages of focusing on admissions, however, come with a cost. Admissions to
prison do not tell the full story of how prison populations change-since releases from prison
are an equally important element. This paper will address the issue of releases below, although
releases are subject to the questions about lagged crime rates.
Langan, supra note 2, at 1572.
2 See Tonry, supra note 2, at 421.
'3 Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 119.
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exogenous increase in the amount of crime will lead to a large increase in
the number of people admitted to prison.
The United States probably did experience an exogenous increase in crime
during the period from 1970 to 1997 as the number of crimes increased
substantially in spite of large increases in incarceration rates and police
forces.' 4 According to the results presented here, the increase in crime ex-
perienced from 1970 to 1997 should have led to an 80 percent increase in
incarceration. This does not suggest, however, that the mechanical theory
offers a complete explanation for the secular rise in imprisonment in the
United States over the past 30 years. Incarceration rates increased almost
fivefold, rather than by 80 percent. Instead, mechanical increases in impris-
onment may constitute one of many important causes of the extraordinary
rise in incarceration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides an informal framework
for evaluating the relationship between crime and incarceration. Section III
surveys and describes the data used in the analysis. In Section IV, simple
OLS regressions estimating the impact of crime rates on incarceration are
presented. Section V discusses the use of abortion as an instrument for crime
and presents the instrumental variables estimates of the impact of crime rates
on abortion rates. In Section VI, various aspects of the relationship between
crime and incarceration are discussed to help determine how changes in crime
rates affect releases from prison and overall incarceration rates. Section VII
concludes.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The notion that changes in crime rates should lead to changes in incar-
ceration rates is an intuitive one. If the probability that a criminal is placed
in prison is independent of the total number of crimes committed, then the
number of prisoners admitted to prison should be a simple function of the
amount of crime. For example, if a machine observed all crimes and randomly
selected a certain proportion of them for incarceration, then imprisonment
would rise in direct proportion to crime.
There are a number of reasons to think that the probability of a criminal
being placed in prison should not be independent of the number of crimes,
however. Moreover, even if the mechanical theory is generally true, the
dynamic relationship between imprisonment and crime makes obtaining ev-
idence regarding the mechanical theory exceedingly difficult. This section
discusses these issues in turn.
Several factors might lead to a less than directly proportional relationship
between imprisonment and crime. If the number of prison cells is always
" See Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Uniform Crime Reports for the United States
(1973-98).
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filled to capacity, for example, then the number of prisoners (in the short
term) should be independent of the amount of crime. Similarly, if law en-
forcement operates more efficiently during periods of low crime rates than
during crime waves, one might expect a less than directly proportional re-
lationship between crime and incarceration. Finally, if police or prosecutors
seek to fill a quota for the number of criminals caught or punished, then the
number of criminals sent to prison would be independent of the amount of
crime (an elasticity of zero).
Other factors may also lead to a partially nonmechanical relationship be-
tween crime levels and imprisonment. (Throughout the text, partially me-
chanical relationships between prisons and crime will refer to positive re-
lationships different from direct proportionality, while a strictly mechanical
relationship implies that the prison population responds in direct proportion
to crime.) For example, if the marginal crime is less severe (and thus less
likely to result in incarceration) than the average crime, then the elasticity
of imprisonment with respect to crime should be less than 1 (and more than
1 if the marginal crime is more severe than the average crime). 5 If law
enforcement responds to period of high crime rates by "cracking down" on
crime (and sending a higher proportion of offenders to prison), however, then
the elasticity of imprisonment with respect to crime may be greater than 1.
Even if none of the aforementioned factors are significant, the dynamic
nature of the relationship between crime and incarceration rates makes es-
timating the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration quite difficult.
Since convicted criminals often spend more than 1 year in prison, the number
of individuals in prison in any given year depends not only on the crime
rate for that year but also on many lags of the crime rate. Moreover, the
relationship between lagged crime rates and current incarceration rates is
ambiguous. High crime rates 5 years ago, for example, might lead to high
incarceration rates today if most of the prisoners convicted 5 years ago remain
in prison in the present. If many criminals serve only 5-year sentences, by
contrast, then the incarceration rate may drop in the present even if the
contemporaneous crime rate changes little from the previous year. Finally,
crime rates in a given locale are highly autocorrelated, which makes esti-
mation of coefficients on various lags of crime subject to increased standard
errors. Thus, disentangling the effects of various lags of the crime rate on
the incarceration rate may be nearly impossible.
In total, these factors (and many others) may cause theoretical and em-
pirical deviations from a strictly mechanical (one-to-one) relationship be-
tween imprisonment and crime. Moreover, the net impact of these factors
will be ambiguous. As a result, the mechanical theory should be viewed
" Note that in the empirical specifications below, this possibility is partially controlled for
through the separation of crimes into property and violent crimes, which have different pro-
pensities to lead to incarceration.




Variable Mean Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Property crime per 1,000 residents 44.4 11.0 3.7
Violent crime per 1,000 residents 5.0 2.6 .80
Weighted total crime per 1,000 residents 18.8 5.1 1.6
Prison admissions per 1,000 residents 1.41 .69 .42
Prison releases per 1,000 population 1.23 .64 .39
Prisoners per 1,000 residents 2.5 1.2 .72
Police per 1,000 residents 2.66 .54 .24
Income per capita ($1997) 21,877 3,653 1,493
Unemployment .059 .017 .012
Poverty rate 13.4 4.03 1.8
Effective abortion rate per 1,000 live
births, violent crime 53 63 50
Effective abortion rate per 1,000 live
births, property crime 93 92 73
NOTE.-All values are unweighted averages of state-level data for the 48 continental U.S. states for the
period 1985-97 (624 observations). The data sources are described in the text. Effective abortion rates are
defined in the text (equation (2)).
more as a benchmark for analysis than as a definitive empirical prediction.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming lack of support for the mechanical theory
in the literature is striking, even after consideration of these mitigating factors.
In the following sections, the effectiveness of the mechanical theory as a
benchmark is tested by using a number of techniques that hopefully mitigate
the empirical complications that plague other studies.
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
For this study, I will use panel data on the 48 continental U.S. states from
the years 1985-97.6 These years are chosen because they span the period
during which abortion begins to have an impact on crime rates. 7 Table 1
presents unweighted state averages of many of the variables used in this
paper.
Data on crime are taken from the Uniform Crime Reports published by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)."s The FBI collects data on several
types of "index crimes" that are known to police in a given state in a given
year. Violent index crimes include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, assault, and robbery. 9 The crimes that comprise the property
6 I thank John Donohue and Steven Levitt for graciously sharing much of the data used in
this paper.
'7 See Donohue & Levitt, supra note 9.
's See FBI, supra note 14.
'9 Definitions for violent index crimes are available at http://www.ci.chi.il.us/Community
Policing/Statistics/IndexCrimeDefs.html.
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index are burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.2" Table 1 also presents
figures for "weighted total crime." This figure is an average of property crime
and total crime and is weighted to reflect the fact that the two types of crimes
make up differing proportions of prison admissions.2 Since violent crimes
have a greater chance of being punished with imprisonment than do property
crimes, violent index crimes receive a higher weighting on the average (vi-
olent crimes have a weight of approximately .65, while property crimes get
a weighting of .35).22
Table I also presents data on several statistics concerning the prison pop-
ulation of the United States.23 The data on prisoners come from the Correc-
tional Populations in the United States survey published by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics.24 Over the period in question, the average state incarcerated
approximately 2.5 prisoners per 1,000 residents. This incarceration rate in
the United States is considerably higher than that of any other Western
nation. The source for data on the number of admissions to and releases
from prison (by state and year) is the National Prisoner Statistics data series,
20 It should be noted that the Uniform Crime Reports includes only crimes that are known
to the police. Crimes that are not reported are not included in the data. Victimization surveys
tend to reveal that there is a considerable amount of crime that goes unreported to police. See
John Dilulio, Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 3,
6-12 (1996). This raises some questions concerning measurement error, although there is some
reason to believe that the error will be constant. See Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased
Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error? 36
Econ. Inquiry 353 (1998), for a full discussion.
2 Note that the proportion of crimes is taken from the year 1985 to minimize endogeneity
issues. In addition, note that simply weighting by the proportion of property and violent
criminals in prison is inaccurate, since the violent criminals spend longer periods in jail per
crime. Thus, property criminals tend to make up a higher proportion of admitted criminals
then would be assumed from their proportion of the prison population. Property criminals
make up about 30 percent of prison admissions, while violent criminals make up about 45
percent. Other crimes, such as drug-related crimes, make up the remainder. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Correctional Populations in the United States (1980-98) (http://ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
abstract/cpusst.htm; checked in 2001).
22 Note that changes in the weights make little difference to the regression results below.
23 Note that this paper studies only prison populations, which do not include jail inmates.
(Jail inmates inhabit county facilities and include individuals held in pretrial detention as well
as those serving very short sentences.) Including jail inmates would complicate the empirical
work to a great degree because jail inmates often serve less than I year in prison, making the
problem of lags between crime and incarceration even more intractable. Moreover, the number
of jail inmates in the United States increased at almost the exact same rate as the number of
prisoners during the period 1985-97 (an approximately 120 percent increase for jail inmates
during this period and a 130 percent increase for prisoners; see Bureau of Justice Statistics,
supra note 21). This trend, along with the fact that the prison population is more than twice
as large as the jail population, suggests (but does not prove) that the results presented below
apply to general U.S. incarceration policies.
24 Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 21.
2 Tonry, supra note 2, at 419.
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collected annually by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.26 The mean admission
rate is higher than the mean release rate, which reflects the secular rise in
total imprisonment that occurred from 1985 to 1997. Moreover, it is important
to note that the increase in imprisonment rates has not simply been the result
of a policy of imprisoning drug offenders. Indeed, the proportion of inmates
imprisoned for drug offenses in state prisons has declined over the past
decade.27
Figure 1 graphs prison admissions, total prison population, and violent and
property index crime rates by year. Note the distinct patterns in the prison
data and the crime data. Both prison admissions and total prison population
climb continuously from 1985 to 1997. Indeed, prison admissions and pop-
ulations more than doubled over this 12-year period. Crime rates, by contrast,
rise until approximately 1992 and then begin to decline. These conflicting
patterns highlight the argument that incarceration rates are independent of
crime rates; the incarceration figures rise at almost the same rate when crime
rates rise as when they fall.
Data on the number of police in each state, once-lagged to minimize
endogeneity, are also obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports. Data for
other controls, such as state per capita income, state unemployment rates,
and state poverty rates, are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States.2" A discussion of the data on abortion can be found below.
IV. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF THE ELASTICITY OF
PRISON ADMISSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRIME
This section tests the mechanical theory of prison admissions using OLS
regressions on the data just described. According to this theory, the number
of admissions should change in proportion to a change in crime rates.
To test this theory, I estimate the following equation:
P, = 3c, + O, + X, + X'6 + 8,, (1)
where s denotes states and t corresponds to years. The variable p,, is the log
of the per capita prison admissions rate, c ,, is the log of the per capita crime
rate, 0, and X, are state and year fixed effects, respectively, X is a vector of
control variables, and e,, is an error term. According to the strict mechanical
theory of incarceration rates, 3 = 1; if crime goes up by 1 percent, the num-
ber of admissions to prison should also rise by the same percentage.
There are several important specification issues worth noting. The coef-
26 Note that the National Prisoner Statistics data set records admissions to prison. Admissions
to prison are admissions of convicted and sentenced criminals and do not include individuals
being held for other reasons, such as indicted criminals awaiting trial.
27 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 21, at 50 (data from 1997 edition).
2' FBI, supra note 14; Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (various
years).
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
ficients are estimated using unweighted regressions. Since the policy response
to crime is the variable of interest, there is no reason to lend more weight
to larger states.29 In addition, equation (1) includes controls for year effects.
The rising trend in prison population will be reflected in the year effects (the
X,) and thus will not impact the coefficients of primary interest. Prison pop-
ulations have been rising for many reasons.3° To isolate the impacts of changes
in crime on the prison population, it is necessary to control for these other
factors, even if this entails forgoing direct explanation of the rise in
imprisonment.
Another concern with the specification is the fact that criminals who com-
mit crimes that occur in year t will often not be admitted to prison until year
t + 1. Indeed, according to a survey of jurisdictions by the National Center
for State Courts,32 the median case-processing time from arrest to disposition
was 125 days. This suggests that lags of almost half-a-year (or sometimes
even longer) between crime and admission to prison may be quite common.
As a result, almost half of the prisoners admitted to prison in 1 year (p,,)
will have committed the crime for which they are sentenced in the previous
year (c _,).
To address this issue, this paper will employ a moving average approach.
Since the relevant crime rate that influences the number of prisoners admitted
to prison in year t is not c,, but rather a combination of c,, and c ,,_I, the
estimations will use a weighted average (with weights of approximately .6
and .4, respectively) of these two crime figures in place of the cs, term that
appears in equation (1). (Using alternative weighting schemes does not
change the results of the study appreciably.)
Finally, an important recent paper by Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo,
and Sendhil Mullainathan suggests that serial correlation in error terms may
bias estimates of standard errors in studies employing differences-in-differ-
ences methodologies over a panel of states, even after controlling for state
fixed effects.3 Since the research design described here shares some simi-
larities with the differences-in-differences methodology, the tables below will
29 Weighting the results by state population reduces the OLS estimates by approximately 15
percent. Note also that the data for a larger state are not estimated any more accurately than
the observations for smaller states. For each state, there is only one observation per variable
per year.
. See Section VIB for discussion.
' It will be possible to use the results described here to obtain an indirect estimate of the
impact of rising crime rates (from 1973 to 1997) on the prison population. See Section VI
infra.
32 Brian J. Ostrom & Neil B. Kauder, Examining the Work of State Courts, 1998: A National
Perspective from the Court Statistics Project (1999).
" See Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We
Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates? (Working Paper No. w8841, Nat'l Bur. Econ. Res.,
March 2002). The authors show how autocorrelation in both error terms and in a treatment
variable can bias downward standard error estimates in differences-in-differences studies.
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TABLE 2
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) AND INSTRUMENTAL
VARIABLES (IV) REGRESSION RESULTS
ln(Prison Admissions per Capita)
OLS IV
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(total crime per capita)a .59 .59 1.16 1.07
(.13)** (.13)** (.28)** (.30)**
[.261* [.23]* [.68] [.70]
Unemployment rate -. 0052 -. 0053
(.010) (.0010)
[.013] [.0141
In(income per capita) -1.060 -1.32
(.48)* (.5 1)*
[.69] [.81]
Poverty rate -. 013 -. 010
(.006)* (.006)
[.012] 1.012]
In(police per capita) -. 039 -. 138
(.11) (.12)
[.20] [.251
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. Serial-correlation corrected standaid errors
are in square brackets. The dependent variable is the log of the number of prison admissions
per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The data set includes annual
state-level observations from the 48 continental U.S. states from 1985 to 1997. Eslimation
is robust to heteroskedasticity. There are 624 observations in all equations. The police
variables are once-lagged to minimize endogeneity bias. Data sources are described in the
text.
Two-year moving average.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
report two estimates of standard errors for the parameter estimates of the
impact of crime on imprisonment. Below each parameter estimate, the number
appearing in parentheses is the traditional fixed-effects estimate of the stan-
dard error, which is directly comparable to the estimates of previous studies.
Below this standard error there appears another standard error estimate in
brackets. This estimate attempts to address the serial-correlation concern by
allowing for within-state serial correlation of the error terms, even after
controlling for state fixed effects.34
The results of the fixed-effects, panel data regressions (equation (1)) are
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. Column 1 presents results without
controls aside from year and state fixed effects, while column 2 includes
control variables. The coefficients for the control variables estimated in col-
umn 2 are generally consistent with the estimates presented in previous
' Standard errors are adjusted using the robust cluster command in Stata. Note that while
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan advocate this option for differences-in-differences studies,
its effectiveness in IV studies such as this one is unknown (see below).
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estimates of similar specifications.35 Note that higher per capita income and
higher poverty rates are negatively associated with incarceration.
In the regressions presented here, the elasticity of prison admissions with
respect to crime (/3) is approximately .59. A 1 percent increase in crime is
associated with a .59 percent increase in the number criminals admitted to
prison (column 2). This result is robust to several different specifications,
including changes in the weighting of property and violent crimes as well
as changes in the weighting of present-year versus previous-year crime rates.
The elasticities of prison admissions with respect to crime that are pre-
sented here are considerably higher than the estimates suggested by the
previous studies, which often find little or no relationship between changes
in crime rates and changes in incarceration rates.36
There are two primary reasons for this distinction. First, the choice of
prison admissions (as opposed to overall prison population) as the dependent
variable allows this specification to hone in on the contemporaneous rela-
tionship between incarceration and crime. Other studies are confounded by
the dynamic relationship between overall incarceration rates and crime.
The specification presented here also includes controls for year effects.
This helps disentangle the impacts of changes in crime on incarceration from
the other trends that affect imprisonment rates during the period in question.37
Indeed, the year effects are all positive (the excluded year is 1985), which
reveals a secular increase in prison admissions rates that is (at least partially)
independent of changes in crime (see Table 3, columns 1 and 2). Some of
the explanations that have been offered (among many others) to explain this
trend in imprisonment include the rising rate of drug-related arrests, decreas-
ing prison costs, an increasing tendency toward incarceration ("getting tough
on crime"), and the interaction with U.S. political trends. Many scholars,
however, reject these explanations (with the possible exception of the latter)
as inadequate 38 and view the startling rise of incarceration in the United
States as one of the greatest mysteries of U.S. public policy over the last 2
decades.39
While the estimates of the elasticity of prison admissions with respect to
crime presented here are higher than existing estimates, they are considerably
3 See Levitt, supra note 5, table 5.
36 See note 2 supra for a list of citations.
3 Including year effects, however, precludes direct explanations of this trend. In Section VI,
however, I will attempt to use the indirect evidence obtained from this paper to study how
changes in crime rates might have affected incarceration rates.
38 For example, the real per-inmate prison cost increased by approximately 20 percent from
1986 to 1996. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Prison Expenditures, 1996 (1999). More-
over, it is important to note that the increase in imprisonment rates has not simply been the
result of a policy of imprisoning drug offenders. Indeed, the proportion of inmates imprisoned
for drug offenses in state prisons has declined over the past decade. See Bureau of Justice
Statistics, supra note 21.
" See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1; and Tonry, supra note 2.
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TABLE 3
YEAR EFFECTS FROM ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) AND
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (IV) REGRESSIONS
In(Prison Admissions per Capita)
OLS IV
YEAR (1) (2) (3) (4)
1986 .033 (.04) .075 (.041) .011 (.042) .058 (.043)
1987 .084 (.041)* .132 (.043)** .048 (.044) .109 (.045)*
1988 .156 (.041)** .219 (.046)** .115 (.045)** .196 (.049)**
1989 .335 (.041)** .421 (.050)** .288 (.046)** .394 (.053)**
1990 .372 (.042)** .471 (.051)** .315 (.048)** .435 (.056)**
1991 .381 (.042)** .481 (.049)** .314 (.051)** .435 (.057)**
1992 .425 (.042)** .556 (.053)** .368 (.048)** .517 (.059)**
1993 .445 (.041)** .583 (.054)** .404 (.045)** .555 (.057)**
1994 .46 (.041)** .62 (.061)** .425 (.044)** .6 (.062)**
1995 .492 (.041)** .706 (.073)** .457 (.044)** .685 (.074)**
1996 .522 (.040)** .767 (.080)** .5 (.042)** .756 (.081)**
1997 .579 (.040)** .815 (.080)** .572 (.041)** .818 (.081)**
NOTE. -This table presents the value of the year-effect controls included in the
regressions presented in Table 2. The omitted year is 1985. Standard errors are in
parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the number of prison admissions
per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The data set includes
annual state-level observations from the 48 continental U.S. states from 1985 to
1997. There are 624 observations in all equations. Estimation is robust to heter-
oskedasticity across states. The police variables are once-lagged to minimize en-
dogeneity bias. Data sources are described in the text.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
lower than the prediction made by the strict mechanical theory of incarcer-
ation, which would predict an elasticity (3) of 1. Indeed, a t-test of the
elasticity coefficients being equal to 1 is rejected at the 99 percent confidence
level. As briefly discussed in Section I, however, there is good reason to
suspect that endogeneity biases the estimate of i downward. The next section
will attempt to control for this endogeneity using an instrumental variables
(IV) approach.
V. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION
It is easy to imagine an endogenous relationship between crime and in-
carceration rates. While crime rates should help determine incarceration rates
through the mechanical relationship described above, crime rates are them-
selves partially determined by incarceration rates. High incarceration rates
may deter crime-if criminals perceive that there is a higher probability of
going to prison, they will be less likely to commit crimes. In addition, high
incarceration rates can lower crime through an incapacitation effect. If po-
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tential criminals are in prison rather than at large, then the population of
criminals goes down and there may be fewer crimes."
Several empirical studies, including those of Thomas Marvell and Carlisle
Moody and particularly of Levitt,4 obtain results suggesting that higher
incarceration rates lower crime. Levitt's paper finds an estimated elasticity
of crime with respect to prisoners of around -. 4. The empirical evidence
clearly shows that incarceration rates help determine crime rates, which sug-
gests that studies of the impact of crime rates on incarceration must control
for endogeneity. 42
A. Abortion and Crime Rates
Controlling for this endogeneity requires a source of exogenous variation
in crime rates. For this study, I will use abortion rates during the 1970s as
the source of exogenous variation.43 As Donohue and Levitt show in their
seminal paper," abortion rates in the 1970s (which varied widely) are im-
portant determinants of changes in crime rates in the 1990s.
Donohue and Levitt employ an intuitive approach to find a connection
between abortion and crime. They note that abortion rates in the 1970s varied
greatly among states. Five states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York, and
Washington) were early legalizers (from 1967 to 1970) rather than legalizers
after the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision in early 1973. These states
obviously had higher legal abortion rates than other states before 1973. More-
over, since abortion infrastructures do not become reality overnight, it took
all states some time to reach steady state abortion rates. Abortion rates in
all states were higher in 1979, for example, than in 1973.45 In addition,
different states may have very different steady-state levels of abortion. These
differences stem from a number of factors, including demographic differences
among state populations, attitudes of the public toward abortion, distances
between abortion centers, and so on.46
0 See Robert D. Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, chaps. I I & 12 (2000), for
discussions of deterrence and incapacitation.
4 Marvell & Moody, supra note 2; Levitt, supra note 5.
42 In statistical terms, the discussion presented here implies that the error term (s,,) from
equation (I) negatively affects crime, so cov(s,,, c,,)< 0. Since with endogeneity bias
k.,- 0 = cov(r,, c,,)/var(c,,),
the OLS coefficient for 0 estimated in the previous section will be biased downward. See
Fumio Hayashi, Econometrics 188 (2000).
43 Please note that the use of abortion rates in this paper is strictly for scientific purposes
and does not imply any position on the contentious issue of the legality and availability of
abortion.
4 See Donohue & Levitt, supra note 9.
45 Id., figure 1.
, See Abortion Factbook: Readings, Trends, and State and Local Data to 1988 (Stanley K.
Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort eds. 1992).
MORE CRIME, MORE PRISONERS?
Since criminals are disproportionately young,47 abortion in the 1970s
should reduce the size of the criminal population in the late 1980s and 1990s
by reducing the size of the cohort that commits the majority of crime. Fur-
thermore, Donohue and Levitt claim (and bring supporting evidence) that
the decrease in the size of the criminal population is even greater than the
decrease in the size of the cohort since abortion rates tend to be high in
high-crime-rate demographic categories (such as children of teenage moth-
ers). Since abortion rates in the 1970s varied widely among states, Donohue
and Levitt utilize cross-state variation in abortion rates and crime to identify
the impact of abortion on crime. They find that "crime was almost 15-25
percent lower in 1997 than it would have been absent legalized abortion."48
Donohue and Levitt's findings have been incisively critiqued in some new
research. Using more "cohort-based" analytical techniques, these research-
ers find a greatly reduced (or even zero) impact of abortion on crime. A
number of the specifications in these papers, however, do find some (reduced)
impact of abortion on crime, although the primary impact of abortion would
appear to be through its cohort-size-reducing effects rather than through
selectively greater impacts on high-crime-rate populations.5° As one survey
of the controversy over Donohue and Levitt's article noted, "The same re-
viewers who believe the study has probably overstated the effect of abortion
liberalization agree that the authors most likely have uncovered an important
mechanism contributing to the lower crime rates."'" For the purposes of this
study, even a reduced impact of abortion on crime is sufficient for the spec-
ification presented below.
After controlling for state fixed effects, it is difficult to envision how
abortion rates in the 1970s could be directly determining imprisonment rates
in the 1990s (other than through crime). There is no doubt that the abortion
rate of a state is not random. Large, urban states such as California and New
York tend to have higher rates of abortion than smaller states. After con-
trolling for state fixed effects, however, the nonrandomness of abortion within
a state should be of much less concern.
One might also be concerned that different steady-state levels of abortion
in different states reflect underlying sentiments that also were manifested in
17 According to Cooter & Ulen, supra note 40, chap. 12, about two-thirds of all street crime
in the United States is committed by persons aged 15-24.
48 Donohue & Levitt, supra note 9, at 418.
41 See Ted Joyce, Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime? (Working Paper No. 8319, Nat'l
Bur. Econ. Res., June 2001); and John R. Lott, Jr., & John E. Whitley, Abortion and Crime:
Unwanted Children and Out-of-Wedlock Births (Working Paper No. 254, Yale L. Sch. Program
Stud. L., Econ., & Pub. Pol'y 2001).
" See, for example, table 2 in Joyce, supra note 49; and Phillip B. Levine et al., Roe v.
Wade and American Fertility, 89 Am. J. Pub. Health 199 (1999).
"' Sasha Abramsky, Did Roe v. Wade Abort Crime? Am. Prospect, January 1, 2001, at 26.
Note that including region-year intereaction terms in my regressions, which partially addresses
some of the critiques, does not materially address the results presented here.
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social programs in the 1970s that might have affected at-risk children. For
example, if high abortion rates are correlated with high welfare payments,
then it is possible that it is the welfare payments that are causing the reduction
in crime rather than abortion. For the purposes of this study, however, this
distinction is not of critical importance. Whether it was abortion laws them-
selves or the programs with which these laws are correlated that are re-
sponsible for the decrease in crime in the 1990s does not change the validity
of the IV specification. So long as all these programs are not correlated with
the unobservable determinants of prison admissions in the 1990s, the spec-
ification is valid.52
Abortion's impact on crime will be felt only gradually. As each year passes,
the fraction of the population that is affected by abortion increases. In 1990,
for example, only cohorts aged 17 and younger were affected by Roe v.
Wade. By 1997, cohorts aged 24 and younger were impacted by Roe v. Wade
(which was decided in early 1973). Since the percentage of criminals aged
24 and younger is much higher than the percentage aged 17 and younger,
abortion rates in the 1970s should have a larger impact on crime in 1997
than in 1990. 3
To apply this idea empirically, this paper employs the "effective abortion
rate" (as,) as defined by Donohue and Levitt:
as, = abortion,-ag(arrestsage/arresttotai). (2)
all ages
The "importance" of a lagged abortion rate (in year t - age) for deter-
mining the crime rate in year t depends on the proportion of the total criminal
population (for a particular crime) that is of that age.54 The effective abortion
rate aggregates these lagged abortion rates into one figure.
The bottom of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the effective abor-
tion rates for violent and property crimes. The data for abortion are taken
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.5 Note the large standard
deviations for these figures, both overall and even within states. This reflects
the large differences in abortion rates across states as well as the lag between
the legalization of abortion and the time at which the steady-state abortion
rate for a particular state is reached. In addition, the effective abortion rates
52 This argument can also be applied to some of the critiques of the Donohue-Levitt analysis
described above. These critiques suggest that the supposed correlation between abortion and
crime is the result of state-specific period effects that moved across the nation at different
times. If these effects are uncorrelated with the unobservable determinants of prison admissions
(and given the idiosyncratic nature of these state-specific period effects, this does not seem to
be an unreasonable suspicion), then abortion would still serve as a valid instrument for crime,
even if the critiques of the Donohue-Levitt paper are entirely valid.
5" See Donohue & Levitt, supra note 9, at 394.
14 The arrest proportions were determined using 1985 data to minimize potential endogeneity
bias.
" Bureau of the Census, supra note 28.
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for violent crimes are lower than those for property crimes (53 versus 93
per 1,000 live births). This reflects the fact that violent criminals tend to be
older than property criminals. As a result, it will take longer for abortion
rates to have an impact on violent crimes.5 6
This paper now attempts to estimate the response of prison admissions to
crime through an IV approach by using the effective abortion rate as an
instrument. The specification is
Ps = 03 , + X, + X',6 + es,, (3)
where 0, and X, are state and year fixed effects, X,, is a vector of control
variables, s,, is an error term, and s, (predicted crime) is estimated using
cs, = pa,, + A, + T, + X',+ (4)
where a,, is the effective abortion rate in state s at time t, it, and r, are state
and year fixed effects, X,, is a vector of control variables, and 77, is an error
term for the first stage. Note that c., and a,, are both 2-year moving averages
rather than 1-year totals to take account of the fact that many criminals are
sent to jail in the year after they commit a crime (as discussed above).
B. Results of Instrumental Variables Estimation
Table 4 presents results from the first-stage regression (equation (4)) with-
out and with control variables (columns 1 and 2). As shown by the results
in Donohue and Levitt's paper, abortion is an important determinant of crime.
In the specifications with and without controls, the effective abortion rate is
significant at the 99 percent confidence level, with a t-statistic greater than
11. The magnitude of the coefficient is also substantial. A 1-standard-
deviation difference in the effective abortion rate in 1997 was associated
with an approximately 7 percent change in crime-a state with an effective
abortion rate in 1997 that was slightly less than 1 standard deviation above
the mean (100 effective abortions per 1,000 live births above the mean)
would have a 7 percent lower crime rate, ceteris paribus.57
The parameter estimates of the control variables (presented in column 2
of Table 4) included in this regression are measured imprecisely arid generally
have insignificant impacts on crime. These results are consistent with many
56 Donohue & Levitt, supra note 9, at 394.
7 Note that although this regression is similar in spirit to those presented in Donohue &
Levitt, supra note 9, there are two salient differences. In addition to the use of 2-year moving
averages rather than I-year figures for crime and abortion, these regressions are unweighted.
While Donohue and Levitt are primarily interested in estimating the impact of abortion on
overall crime levels in the United States (and therefore use weighted regression), this study
focuses on policy choices by states, and therefore the regressions are unweighted. Because of
these differences, the impacts of abortion found here are lower than the more direct estimates
presented in Donohue & Levitt (id.). The standard errors of the coefficients, however, are con-
siderably smaller.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN




"Effective" abortion rate x 100 -. 068 -. 079
(.009)** (.009)**
[.006]** [.006]**
State unemployment rate .01
(.003)**
[.0031**
Poverty rate -. 0020(.002)
[.0016]
In(police per capita) once lagged .16
(.36)
[.36]
In(income per capita) .14
(.20)
[.14]
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log
in the weighted per capita crime rate (an average of property and violent crime
rates in which violent crime rates are given extra weight since they are more
frequently punished by imprisonment). All regressions include state and year
fixed effects. Estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity across states and years.
All variables are 2-year averages. The data set includes annual state-level ob-
servations from the 48 continental U.S. states from 1985 to 1997. There are 624
observations in both equations. The police variables are once-lagged to minimize
endogeneity bias. Data sources are described in the text.
** Significant at the I percent level.
studies of crime, which often find that crime has few significant determi-
nants.5 8 The exception is the unemployment rate, which has a significantly
positive impact on crime.59
A glance at Table 4 reveals that abortion rates in the 1970s are strongly
correlated with crime. As argued above, it is also plausible that abortion rates
should be uncorrelated with the error term (s,) from equation (3). Conse-
quently, I now utilize abortion rates in the 1970s as an instrument for crime
to obtain unbiased estimates of the 3 coefficient from equation (3).
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 present estimates of equation (3) without and
with control variables, respectively. The results are striking. The instrumental
58 For examples of studies that find almost no significant determinants of crime in a first-
differences model, see Kristin F. Butcher & Anne M. Piehl, Cross-City Evidence on the
Relationship between Immigration and Crime, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 457 (1998); and
Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on
Crime, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 270 (1997).
" See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 40, at 415-17, for a thorough discussion of the connection
between unemployment and crime.
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variable estimates of the elasticity of prison admissions with respect to crime
rates (3) are nearly double the OLS estimates (although the standard error
also increases significantly). Indeed, the IV estimates of the elasticity are
quite near (just slightly above) an elasticity of 1; a 1 percent change in crime
is expected to lead to a 1 percent change in the number of prisoners admitted
to prison (that is, 3 = 1). This is exactly what the strict mechanical theory
of prison admissions predicts; ceteris paribus, the number of individuals sent
to prison fluctuates in direct proportion to the amount of crime.
The serial-correlation-corrected standard errors (in brackets) for these es-
timations are extremely high (more than double the traditionally estimated
standard errors), which suggests that these results must be treated with more
than the usual "grain of salt." Because incarceration figures are highly cor-
related within state, it may be difficult to obtain precise (unbiased) estimates
of the coefficients of interest.
When the regression data are weighted by state population, however, the
IV estimate of the elasticity is reduced to approximately .3 (with standard
errors approximately 40 percent larger than the unweighted estimates). This
implies that small states have considerably more flexible policy responses
to changes in crime rates than do larger states.' Note, however, that the
weigh-
ted regression results are dominated by the results of California. When Cal-
ifornia is omitted from the weighted regression, the estimate moves to ap-
proximately .7.
The divergence of results of the IV estimation from the OLS estimation
suggests that endogeneity bias is an important factor that obfuscates previous
studies of the relationship between imprisonment and crime. When the impact
of imprisonment on crime is "controlled" by using an instrument, the estimate
of the elasticity of prison admissions with respect to crime doubles, imply-
ing that there is a large bias in OLS estimates of the impact of crime on
imprisonment.
The model's other parameters are generally imprecisely estimated. After
controlling for crime rates, I find that unemployment, poverty rates, and the
number of police have insignificant impacts on imprisonment. As in the OLS
specification, per capita income has a significantly negative impact on im-
prisonment. Note again that the year effects (displayed in Table 3) for these
regressions (the excluded year is the first year, 1985) are invariably positive,
which reflects the upward trend in prison admissions. As mentioned above,
the estimate of the elasticity of imprisonment with respect to crime that is
presented here does not undermine the proposed importance of many other
factors that drive the secular increase in prison admissions during this period.
60 Thus the average "marginal" criminal in the United States is not as likely to go to prison
as the average criminal.
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VI. IMPRISONMENT AND CRIME
The previous section documented that the mechanical theory of impris-
onment and crime performed well with respect to admissions. After con-
trolling for other trends, prison admissions fluctuated in direct proportion to
crime rates. This section attempts to interpret how this finding relates to
overall imprisonment trends and their relationship to crime rates.6 Can the
relationship uncovered between prison admissions and crime be applied more
generally to the response of imprisonment to crime, or is there some coun-
tervailing factor (such as release rates) that prevents the mechanical rela-
tionship between prison admissions and crime from translating into an equiv-
alent relationship between overall imprisonment and crime?
A. Releases from Prison and Crime Rates
Perhaps the most obvious countervailing factor negating the impact of an
increase in prison admissions on the prison population would be prison
releases. Even if prison admissions do change in direct proportion to crime,
if prison release rates are adjusted to take into account the number of ad-
missions, then the number of prisoners would not change overall. According
to the mechanical theory, by contrast, releases from prison should be inde-
pendent of contemporaneous crime rates, since the prisoners released from
prison in the present period would have committed their crimes in a previous
period.
Table 5 presents results from the following regression:
r, = rcs, + O, + X, + X'6 + s,, (5)
where r,, is the number of prison releases in state s at time t, 0, and X, are
state and year effects, respectively, and X is a vector of control variables.
According to the mechanical theory, r should be near 0; crime in the present
period should have only a slight impact on the number of releases. If all
criminals spend more than 1 year in prison, then releases should be inde-
pendent of the contemporaneous crime rate. Since some criminals spend less
than 1 year in prison, however, releases will be slightly dependent on con-
temporaneous crime rates.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present OLS estimates of equation (5) that
reveal that this prediction is not supported by OLS estimates. The parameter
estimates in these columns suggest that a 1 percent change in crime will be
accompanied by a corresponding .35 percent change in the number of releases
6 As described above, the number and change in the number of prisoners depend on past
crime rates as well as on crime in the present period. Since criminals often serve long prison
terms, disentangling the impact of various lags in the crime rate on overall imprisonment
becomes exceedingly difficult. As a result, the results presented in this section must inevitably
be more speculative than the results presented earlier.
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TABLE 5
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (IV)
REGRESSIONS OF RELEASES FROM PRISON ON THE AMOUNT OF CRIME
ANNUAL PRISON RELEASES PER CAPITA
OLS IV
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(total crime per capita) .331 .39 .109 .251
(.12)** (.12)** (.27) (.29)
[.26] [.23] [.68] [.64]
Unemployment rate 2.304 2.294
(.974)* (.977)*
[1.84] [1.861
Poverty rate -. 015 -. 016
(.006)* (.006)**
[.011] [.011]
In(income per capita) -. 182 -. 162
(.406) (.426)
[.823] [.941]
In(police per capita) -. 256 -. 217
(.131) (.14)
[.276] [.286]
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the
number of prison releases per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.
Estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity across states and years. The data set includes
annual state-level observations from the 48 continental U.S. states from 1985 to 1997.
There are 624 observations in all equations. The police variables are once lagged to
minimize endogeneity bias. Data sources are described in the text.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
from prison. These estimates are significantly different from the zero value
predicted by the mechanical theory.
As with the OLS regression discussed earlier (equation (5)), however, there
is reason to believe that OLS estimates of a will be biased. If states decide
to "crack down" on crime, and this phenomenon is unobserved but negatively
correlated with releases from prison, then the OLS estimate of a should be
biased upward. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show that this is the case. When
crime rates are instrumented by abortion rates (using a specification analogous
to equations (3) and (4)), the elasticity of prison releases with respect to
crime goes down considerably and becomes insignificant at the 5 percent
level (although it remains positive and the standard errors are large). This
evidence suggests that, after controlling for endogeneity, releases may not
respond dramatically to changes in crime rates. Even if the OLS estimates
are accurate, however, it is clear that releases from prison are much less
sensitive to changes in crime rates than are admissions. Consequently, a
change in crime should be associated with a corresponding change in overall
imprisonment, ceteris paribus.
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B. Trends in Imprisonment and Crime
If prison admissions go up with crime and prison releases are not signif-
icantly affected by contemporaneous crime rates, then at least part (but cer-
tainly not all) of the rise in incarceration in the United States may be at-
tributable to changes in the underlying propensity to commit crime and a
mechanical response in imprisonment. The results presented here suggest that
the number of prisoners should go up in a mechanical fashion with the amount
of crime, other things being equal. Thus, even had there been no change in
the propensity to incarcerate between 1970 and 1997, the increase in crime
that occurred during those 27 years would have led to an approximately 80
percent increase62 in the U.S. incarceration rate. While this is a far cry from
the nearly fivefold increase that actually occurred during this period, it does
suggest that the mechanical theory is a valid and important part of the theory
relating crime rates and incarceration rates, particularly when combined
with other trends such as rising sentence lengths or other time-variant
heterogeneities.6 3
This conclusion is supported by an analysis of overall imprisonment trends
in states with high versus low abortion rates in the 1990s. As Figure 1 shows,
overall imprisonment has been increasing in the United States in the 1990s,
in spite of the decrease in crime rates. Clearly, there has been a general push
toward greater incarceration that is independent of crime rates. Nevertheless,
a glance at Table 6 reveals that changes in crime rates do have an impact
on the number of individuals in prison. In Table 6, the 48 continental U.S.
states are divided into quarters on the basis of their effective abortion rate
in 1997. For each quartile, the percentage change in the number of prisoners
(as well as the percentage change in crime rates) is given from 1985 to 1991
and from 1991 to 1997. From 1985 to 1991, before abortion began to have
an important impact on imprisonment rates (because the effective abortion
rate was relatively low and imprisonment responds with a long lag to changes
in crime), the high-abortion-rate states witnessed the highest average increase
in prison population among the three groups by a large margin. In the second
half of the period, by contrast (when abortion begins to have an important
62 This figure was calculated by comparing the violent index crime rate per capita in the
1970s with that in 1997 and applying the elasticity of I between imprisonment and crime that
is found here. Note that if prison deters crime, then the enormous rise in incarceration should
be deterring some crime, which suggests that the underlying propensity to commit crime has
risen by greater than 80 percent. Thus, the estimate presented here is a lower bound. The
National Crime Victimization survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice, however, does not
show a rise in crime of the same magnitude during this period. See Dilulio, supra note 20,
for a discussion.
63 Note that if incarceration would have increased by 80 percent because of mechanical
factors, the underlying propensity to incarcerate did not increase fivefold between 1970 and
1997, but rather by only 275 percent (500/180 = 2.75). Note that the rise in incarceration
during the 1970s and 1980s is even more attributable to mechanical factors since these years
witnessed an even greater increase in crime rates.
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TABLE 6
CHANGES IN INCARCERATION (1985-97) AS A FUNCTION OF ABORTION RATES
CHANGE IN INCARCERATION CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME
RATES (%) RATES (%)
ABORTION FREQUENCY 1985-91 1991-97 1985-91 1991-97
Lowest (Q1) 38 38 30 0
Medium-low (Q2) 37 37 18 -8
Medium-high (Q3) 40 34 25 -14
Highest (Q4) 44 31 22 -21
NOTE.-The 48 continental U.S. states are ranked into quartiles on the basis of effective abortion rate
in 1997 (see equation (1)). Each cell presents the unweighted mean change of the variable in question
for the states in the given quartile during the years noted. Imprisonment rates are taken from Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations in the United States (1980-98), abortion data from the
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years), and crime data from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States (1973-98).
impact on crime), the situation reverses. The high-abortion-rate group ex-
perienced the largest decrease in crime among the four groups, and it also
had the smallest increase in prison population after having the largest im-
prisonment increase in the first period. Similarly, the third quartile of effective
abortion rates also demonstrates a relatively large drop in crime and small
increase in the number of prisoners. These results suggest that, although there
is clearly a trend toward greater imprisonment within the United States during
this period, less crime does lead to fewer prisoners, all other things being
equal.'
VII. CONCLUSION
As the previous section noted, this paper has demonstrated that the me-
chanical theory of crime and imprisonment rates has some empirical support,
all things being equal. This is not to claim that all things have been equal.
Clearly, there has been a significant increase in the propensity to imprison
in the United States, as the time effects in the regressions above reveal (see
Table 3). Nevertheless, the claim that the mechanical theory of crime and
incarceration has "virtually no validity"65 is likely overstated. Previous papers
showing no relationship between changes in crime rates and changes in
incarceration failed to address the endogeneity or the dynamic relationship
between crime and incarceration. Once this endogeneity is addressed by
instrumenting, the mechanical theory performs quite well in predicting in-
carceration rates (controlling for trend), which suggests that incarceration
policies are not as paradoxical as they are sometimes portrayed. As a result,
' Note that because of endogeneity issues and the long time lags required, an IV regression
approach to estimating the impact of crime on imprisonment rates would be extremely
imprecise.
63 Tonry, supra note 2, at 421.
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some of the critiques of the penal system in the United States' that rely on
the failure of the mechanical theory must be viewed with greater skepticism.
There is reason to suspect that the mechanical theory of crime and incar-
ceration may begin to play a more obvious role in influencing U.S. incar-
ceration rates. Since there is a lag between changes in crime rates and changes
in incarceration rates, the 1990s decline in crime may only now be affecting
the size of the prison population through the mechanical path. Indeed, recent
incarceration patterns in the United States suggest that the trend of rising
incarceration rates may have crested. The year 2000 witnessed the smallest
annual growth rate in prison population in 29 years.67 Moreover, in states
with high abortion rates that have witnessed large decreases in crime, such
as New York and California, the prison population has even begun to de-
cline.68 Such developments imply that the mechanical theory may be a critical
(and more obvious) determinant of imprisonment trends over the next decade.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abramsky, Sasha. "Did Roe v. Wade Abort Crime?" American Prospect,
January 1, 2001, at 26.
Beck, Alan, and Karberg, J. Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2000.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001.
Bertrand, Marriane; Duflo, Esther; and Mullainathan, Sendhil. "How Much
Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?" Working Paper
No. w8841. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research,
March 2002.
Biles, David. "Crime and the Use of Prisons." Federal Probation 43 (1979):
39-43.
Bowker, Lee H. "Crime and the Use of Prisons in the United States: A Time-
Series Analysis." Crime and Delinquency 27 (1981): 206-12.
Butcher, Kristin F., and Piehl, Anne M. "Cross-City Evidence on the
Relationship between Immigration and Crime." Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 17 (1998): 457-93.
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Correctional Populations in the United States.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
various years.
Bureau of Justice Statistics. State Prison Expenditures, 1996. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999.
See note 7 supra for examples of such studies.
67 Alan Beck & Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2000 (2001).
OR David Rohde, After Long Climb, New York State's Prison Population Starts to Drop, N.Y.
Times, February 2, 2001, late edition at Al; and David Firestone, U.S. Figures Show Prison
Population Is Now Stabilizing, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2001, at Al. Of the 12 states that experienced
declines in prison population in 2000 (listed in Firestone, supra), 10 have effective abortion
rates above the median and six have effective abortion rates in the highest quartile.
MORE CRIME, MORE PRISONERS?
Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, various years.
Cooter, Robert D., and Ulen, Thomas. Law and Economics. 2d ed. New York:
Addison Wesley, 1997.
Dilulio, John J., Jr. "Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy."
Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (winter 1996): 3-24.
Donohue, John J., III, and Levitt, Steven D. "The Impact of Legalized
Abortion on Crime." Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001):
379-420.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reports for the United States.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, various years.
Firestone, David. "U.S. Figures Show Prison Population Is Now Stabilizing."
New York Times, June 9, 2001, at A9.
Florida Corrections Commission. "The Relationship between Crime Rates
and Incarceration Rates." Working paper. Tallahassee, Fla.: Corrections
Commission, December 1994. http://www.fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/rates/
rateind.html.
Hayashi, Fumio. Econometrics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2000.
Henshaw, Stanley K., and Van Vort, Jennifer. Abortion Factbook: Readings,
Trends and State and Local Data to 1988. New York: Alan Gutmacher
Institute, 1992.
Joyce, Ted. "Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?" Working Paper No.
8319. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, June
2001.
Langan, Patrick A. "America's Soaring Prison Population." Science 251
(1991): 1568-73.
Levine, Phillip, B.; Staiger, Douglas; Kane, Thomas J.; and Zimmerman,
David J. "Roe v. Wade and American Fertility." American Journal of
Public Health 89 (1999): 199-203.
Levitt, Steven D. "The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates:
Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Legislation." Quarterly Journal of
Economics 111 (1996): 319-51.
Levitt, Steven D. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the
Effect of Police on Crime." American Economic Review 87 (1997):
270-90.
Levitt, Steven D. "Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime:
Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?" Economic Inquiry 36
(1998): 353-72.
Lott, John R., Jr., and Whitley, John E. "Abortion and Crime: Unwanted
Children and Out-of-Wedlock Births." Working Paper No. 254. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Law School Program for Studies in Law, Economics
and Public Policy, April 30, 2001.
Marvell, Thomas, and Moody, Carlisle. "Prison Population Growth and
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Crime Reduction." Journal of Quantitative Criminology 10 (1994):
109-40.
Nagel, William. "On Behalf of a Moratorium on Prison Construction." Crime
and Delinquency 23 (1977): 154-72.
National Center for Policy Analysis. "Paradox in Crime and Incarceration."
Policy Issue Note. 1998. http://www.ncpa.org/pi/crime/jan98e.html.
Ostrom, Brian J., and Kauder, Neil B. Examining the Work of State Courts,
1998: A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project.
Williamsburg, Va.: National Center for State Courts, 1999.
Ouimet, Marc, and Tremblay, Pierre. "A Normative Theory of the
Relationship between Crime Rates and Imprisonment Rates: An Analysis
of the Penal Behavior of U.S. States from 1972 to 1992." Journal of
Research on Crime and Delinquency 33 (1996): 109-25.
Rohde, David. "After Long Climb, New York State's Prison Population Starts
to Drop." New York Times (late edition), February 2, 2001, at Al.
Sykes, Gary; Vito, Gennaro F.; and McElrath, Karen. "Jail Populations and
Crime Rates: An Exploratory Analysis." Journal of Police Science and
Administration 15 (1987): 72-7.
Tonry, Michael. "Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?" Crime and
Delinquency 45 (1999): 419-37.
Zimring, Franklin E., and Hawkins, Gordon J. The Scale of Imprisonment.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
